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Abstract
The ability of a manufacturer to enhance competition among its retailers by im-
posing a price floor was recently introduced in the literature. The purpose of this
article is to revisit this anti-collusive explanation of the retail price maintenance in
a more general model in which we introduce asymmetric retailers. We find that a
manufacturer can amplify the retail market’s competition by imposing a price floor
when retailers sell differentiated products. This result contradicts the prevailing
concept of retail price maintenance.
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1 Introduction
Price restrictions are undoubtedly among those practices that are more severely
treated by antitrust authorities than any other vertical restraint, however there is
a trend towards a more flexible attitude.1 Yet, retail price maintenance (RPM)
and price floors are often considered per se illegal.2,3
In a recent article, Overvest (2010) has argued that a monopolist manufacturer
may in fact be able to increase its profit imposing price floor because this makes
a downstream market collusion less profitable. In essence, if retailers interact in
an infinite number of times they may form a cartel which causes the traditional
double marginalization problem to the manufacturer. By imposing a price floor
the producer may destabilize the cartel which increases its profit. The argument is
potentially an important one because it supports the available empirical evidences
which has contradicted the pro-collusion theory of the price maintenance. However,
the result is crucially based on a special model, the infinitely repeated Bertrand
game with homogeneous good, in which the core problem of double marginaliza-
tion does not arise when retailers can not collude. This is not the case when we
introduce differentiated products. Everyday observations suggest that firms expend
considerable efforts to differentiate the products they sell from the products of their
competitors. As a result, we should consider the incentive for price floor and the
impact of it in an industry in which retailers add extra value to the product they
sell. In this article we reconsider the Overvest (2010) model and the downstream
1The US Supreme Court recently revisited the per se ban of the price fixing and replaced a
nearly 100 year old precedent by adopting a rule of reason standard for analyzing resale price
maintenance, see Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, 551 U.S. 877, 127 S. Ct.
2705 (2007)
2Throughout this analysis the minimum resale price and the price floor terms are used syn-
onymously.
3For a broad overview of the effects of the RPM, see Overstreet (1983).
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market is described by a Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products.
We show that a profit maximizing manufacturer selling its product through dif-
ferentiated Bertrand firms has the incentive to impose a price floor on its product
to destabilize a potential tacit collusion and increase competition among retailers.
The intuition behind this result is that retailers find the deviation from a cartel
agreement more profitable or less costly in the presence of a price floor than without
it, and so, a cartel which would be stable in the absence of a price maintenance can
be unstable when manufacturer introduces a price floor. Thus, a retail price main-
tenance can boost competition among retailers which increases the manufacturer’s
profit. Furthermore, we prove that a price floor being introduced to unstabilize a
retailer cartel is a decreasing function of the product differentiation.
2 The Model
We assume the following set-up. A monopolist manufacturer sells its product to
final consumers through two asymmetric retailers. The marginal costs of produc-
tion are c. The retailers have no additional costs in obtaining the products from
the manufacturer.
Demands are given by
Di(pi, pj) = α− pi + βpj (1)
where {i, j} = {A,B} with α > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1). We interpret parameter β as the
degree of product differentiation between final products, for β close to 1 retailers
sell close substitutes, while for β close to 0 they supply to almost independent
markets.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the manufacturer sets its wholesale
price pw and possibly a price floor pf .
4 Second, retailers observe the wholesale
4Note, that here we assume linear prices, a contract specifying a payment Ti(qi) = pwqi from
retailer i to manufacturer.
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price and compete in Bertrand-fashion or they are engaged in tacit collusion in the
market stage where the retailers interact repeatedly many times without knowing
the exact timing of the ending stage of the game.
Here some remarks need to be made. Firstly, we suppose that the retailers are not
aware of the ending of the game, however they know the probability of the stage
game which is going to be the last one and this probability (1 − ρ) does not vary
during the time. Furthermore, we suppose that firms use a common discount factor
of δ ∈ (0, 1) and each retailer can observe and remember the history of the game.
These information constitute common knowledge to the firms. Firms maximize
their discounted pay-offs.
We solve the model using backward induction. The retailers’ one stage profit
maximization problem can be given by
max
pi
pii = (pi − pw)Di(pi, p∗j ) i, j = A,B i 6= j. (2)
This yields the equilibrium prices and profits of the stage game
p∗i =
α+ pw
2− β i = A,B. (3)
pi∗i =
[α− (1− β)pw]2
(2− β)2 i = A,B. (4)
Thus, the manufacturer’s problem can be given by
max
pw
pim = (pw − c)[Di(p∗i ) +Dj(p∗j )](1 + δρ+ δ2ρ2 + . . .) (5)
Hence, the manufacturer sets a wholesale price
p∗w =
α+ (1− β)c
2(1− β) (6)
which yields equilibrium profits
pi∗m =
1
1− δρ
[α− (1− β)c]2
2(2− β)(1− β) (7)
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pi∗i =
1
1− δρ
[α− (1− β)c]2
4(2− β)2 i = A,B. (8)
However, this does not necessarily constitute an equilibrium where retailers are
able to coordinate a tacit collusion on the monopoly price. By colluding, each
retailer earns a stage profit
pi∗i = (p
m
i − pw)(α− pmi + βpmj ) (9)
where
pmi = arg max
pi
[(pi − pw)Di(pi, pmj ) + (pmj − pw)Dj(pi, pmj )] i, j = A,B i 6= j. (10)
Yet, the retailers may not be able to coordinate on the monopoly price. When
the deviation from the cartel price at any stage is profitable the collusion may
not be stable. Supposing trigger strategies being used by retailers deviation is not
profitable if and only if
1
1− δρ
[α− (1− β)c]2
16(1− β) >
(2− β)2[α− (1− β)c]2
64(1− β)2 +
δρ
1− δρ
[α− (1− β)c]2
4(2− β)2
or
δρ > θc ≡ 4− 4β + β
2
8− 8β + β2 (11)
Therefore, the manufacturer sets pw regarding to (6) if δρ ≤ θc and obtains the
profit equal to (7). On the other hand, when the retailers can collude, the manu-
facturer’s problem boils down to
max
pw
pim =
1
1− δρ (pw − c)[Di(p
m
i , p
m
j ) +Dj(p
m
j , p
m
i )] (12)
where pmi (i = A,B) is given by (10), which yields profit equal to
1
1−δρ
[α−(1−β)c]2
4(1−β)2 .
These profits are always smaller than the profit given by (7), if β < 1.
A possible solution to solve the problem caused by double marginalization is to
impose a price floor pf . This may lead to a less stable cartel by making the
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deviation from the cartel agreement less costly. Under a price floor retailers commit
themselves not to charge a price lower than pf . We assume that the manufacturer
is able to enforce such a contract.
A tacit collusion is feasible if and only if the following condition is satisfied
1
1− δρ (p
m
i − pw)(α− pmi + βpmj ) > (pdi − pw)(α− pdi + βpmj ) +
δρ
1− δρ (pf − pw)(α− pf + βpf ) (13)
for every i = A,B (i 6= j), where
pdi = arg max
pi
[(pi − pw)(α− pi + βpmj ) + (pmj − pw)(α− pmj + βpi)].
The right-hand side of the above condition is increasing in pf if δρ > θ
c and
pf ∈ (p∗w, pm), where p∗w is given by (6) and pm = max{pmi , pmj }, where pmi is given
by (10). It is easy to show that for a profit maximizing manufacturer a price floor
equal to pm always dominates any price floor bigger then pm, moreover a price floor
smaller than p∗w can not destabilize a cartel which is feasible next to p
∗
w. Thus to
destabilize a cartel a reasonable price floor to choose is the smallest pf which still
violates condition (13). The manufacturer’s problem can be given by
max
pw
pim = (pw − c)[Di(pf , pf ) +Dj(pf , pf )]
s.t.
1
1− δρ (p
m
i − pw)(α− pmi + βpmj ) = (pdi − pw)(α− pdi + βpmj ) +
δρ
1− δρ (pf − pw)(α− pf + βpf )
which yields
p∗w =
α+ (1− β)c
2(1− β) (14)
p∗i = p
∗
f =
2δρ[3α+ (1− β)c](1− β)− β[α− (1− β)c]√δρ(1− δρ)(1− β)
8δρ(1− β)2 (15)
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pif∗m =
1
1− δρ
[α− (1− β)c]2[2δρ(1− β) + β√δρ(1− δρ)(1− β)]
8δρ(1− β)2 (16)
pif∗i =
1
1− δρ
[α− (1− β)c]2[4δρ(1− β)− (1− δρ)β2]
64δρ(1− β)2 (17)
Hence, if retailers can engage in a tacit collusion a manufacturer will impose a price
floor to destabilize the cartel if and only if its profit next to a price floor (pif∗m ) is
higher than its profit without a price maintenance (pi∗m), that is, when
1
1− δρ
[α− (1− β)c]2[2δρ(1− β) + β√δρ(1− δρ)(1− β)]
8δρ(1− β)2 >
1
1− δρ
[α− (1− β)c]2
4(1− β)2
The above inequality holds if β < 1 which is the case by assumption. Thus, as in the
case of symmetric retailers (see Overvest (2010)), a manufacturer is always better
off by introducing a price floor for its product when retailers have the incentive to
engage in tacit collusion. This result is summarized in the following
Proposition 2.1 If δρ ≤ θc the retailers compete in Bertrand fashion and set the
prices given by (3). The manufacturer sets pw such that pi
m is maximized. If
δρ > θc the retailers would engage in tacit collusion but the manufacturer prevents
this collusive behavior by imposing a price floor. The manufacturer sets a price
floor given by (15), which is higher than the wholesale price. Retailers acquire
positive profits, the manufacturer gains from inducing a price floor.
What drives this conclusion is the fact that retailers can profit from a collusion
if the firms are patient enough, which has a negative effect on the manufacturer’s
profit. Accordingly, the manufacturer has an incentive to prevent a cartel in the
retail market. One way to do this is to impose a price floor.
Having a closer look at the optimal price floor imposed by the manufacturer we
can examine how it is affected by the degree of product differentiation. Taking the
first derivative of the expression (15) with respect to β yields
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∂p∗f
∂β
=
3α
4(1− β)2 −
(1− δρ)[α(2 + β)− c(1− β)(2− β)]
16(1− β)2√δρ(1− δρ)(1− β) (18)
which is strictly positive whenever δρ > θc. This yields the following
Proposition 2.2 The optimal price floor is decreasing in the degree of product
differentiation.
So, a β close to 1 requires a relatively higher price floor than a β close to zero.
To understand the reason why a manufacturer introduces a higher price floor in
the case of less differentiated products, let us consider the case when retailers sell
close substitutes. When selling close substitutes, symmetric retailers earn zero
profit without collusion and have a strong incentive to sustain a tacit collusion.
Therefore, to prevent the cartel a manufacturer has to impose a price floor which
is high enough to make the retailers’ deviation from the cartel agreement profitable.
On the other hand when products are almost independent, that is when β is close
to zero, the cartel becomes harder to sustain and as a result a smaller price floor
can make the cartel unstable.
3 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to show that a manufacturer has an incentive to impose
a price floor to enhance competition and not collusion as the prevailing literature
states. In contrary it demonstrates that the price floor may bear an anti-collusion
effect. The notion was introduced by Overvest (2010) in a special model based
on a homogenous Bertrand competition. In this article we showed that the main
result remains valid even if we suppose differentiated products.
Available empirical results (see Jullien and Rey (2008), Cooper et al. (2005) and
Overstreet (1983)) suggest that after a price floor is being imposed by a manu-
facturer the prices fall in the market which should be plausible after the model
7
presented in this article.
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